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Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR
Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1
JAMES

J. ALFINI*

INTRODUCTION

At the close of the twentieth century, we are witnessing very significant

changes in the litigation of civil disputes in our society. Much of the change

has to do with a more expansive view by lawyers and judges of the means that
may be employed for resolving civil disputes. Cases in litigation are
increasingly being sent to mediation, arbitration, summary jury trial, early
neutral evaluation, and other alternatives to adjudication. Lawyers are
beginning to advise their clients of the availability of these options and are
representing their clients in these alternative fora.
Much has been said and written about these developments-the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement.' However, little attention has
* A.B., Columbia University; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law; Professor
of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I am grateful to the members of the CPRGeorgetown/ABA Dispute Resolution Section Joint Initiative on Ethics of Lawyer
Representatives in ADR for allowing me to work through some of the ideas in this article with
them, to Michael Hill for his superb research assistance, and to Bruce Meyerson, Sharon Press,
Dan Reynolds, Jean Stemlight, Lana Sundahl, and David Taylor for offering helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111
(1976) (proposing a Dispute Resolution Center to relieve overburdened courts); Warren A.
Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (documenting Chief Justice
Burger's suggestion that the substitution of arbitration for litigation is a "better way" of
resolving disputes); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative
DisputeResolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986) (recasting Professor Sander's idea
of a Dispute Resolution Center as the "Multi-door Courthouse"); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Reflections on JudicialADR and the Multi-Door Courthouseat Twenty: FaitAccompli, Failed
Overture, or FledglingAdulthood?, II OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL 297 (1996) (arguing for
"semi-adjudicatory options" as well as trial and settlement initiatives as part of the judicial
dispute resolution movement). The "ADR Movement" has not been without its critics. See,
e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing against the
institutionalization of settlement); Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (raising
questions about the fairness of ADR toward members of minority groups and other
disempowered persons); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing against mandatory mediation in divorce cases). For an
eloquent discussion of these and other criticisms, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute
Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83
GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
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been given to one manifestation of the increased use of ADR. Specifically,

this blossoming of a settlement culture has altered the conduct of lawyers
somewhat, or perhaps more accurately stated, has made certain behaviors
more salient.
This article will argue that we have not created the necessary ethics
infrastructure to support this settlement culture. In many respects, this
important aspect of our litigation process is in a state of anarchy. There are
vague rules to govern our behavior. Although significant changes are needed
in both the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conducte and the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct', this article will focus on only one aspect of this
ethics void - the problem of lawyer gamesmanship and misrepresentations
during ADR proceedings. The development of the settlement culture and the
increased use of ADR will be traced in Part I. Part II will focus on lawyering
in court-sponsored ADR settings, and Part Ill will analyze the current ethics

constraints in these settings. Part IV will argue for revision of Rule 4.1 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a means of addressing this problem.
I. SETTLEMENT CULTURE

The evolution of a new settlement culture is reflected in the changes that
made over the past two decades to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
been
have
Civil Procedure, the pretrial procedure rule. The rule, as it was originally
adopted with the wholesale promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
4 It
Procedure in 1938, was quite brief and relatively narrow in focus.
2. At present, the only guidance for judges involving themselves in settlement
activities is found in Canon 3B(7)(d) of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990): "A
judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers
in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge." This is an exception to the
general prohibition against ex parte communications.
For a comprehensive
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
discussion of the need for new ethics rules to accommodate ADR practices, see Carrie MenkelMeadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities,38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997).
4. The 1938 rule read as follows:
Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues. In any action, the
court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference to consider (1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (3) The
possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of expert
witnesses; (5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
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authorized the judge, as a matter of discretion, to direct the attorneys
representing parties in a civil case to appear before the court for a conference
prior to trial. At this conference various pretrial matters could be considered.
Among them was whether the pleadings should be amended and which facts
and documents, if any, could be admitted without need of proof. This rule
was adopted against a backdrop of a pre-1938, party-driven system of
litigation where there was little ability prior to trial to verify that any factual
basis supported the pleadings, which in some cases were really nothing more
than bare assertions.' The effective result was, as one commentator pointed
out:
A plaintiff's case might have no substantial basis whatever.
A defense might be purely fictitious. Whatever the parties
asserted or denied was taken at its face value as a basis for
the trial

. . .

if a case lacked substance, the trial would

disclose it.... [Wlhether the pleadings represented fact or
fancy was.., a matter to be dealt with at the trial, not at a
preliminary stage.6
As that early proponent of Rule 16 pointed out in rather understated
terms: 'There was a certain economic extravagance in this theory."' Indeed,
there was. Trials consume scarce, limited resources in the forms of money,
time, and judicial expertise. Thus, it was hoped that this getting-ready-fortrial rule would help to ferret out baseless claims and defenses and thus relieve
congested court calendars. As such, it was fairly successful and it remained
unchanged for forty-five years.

conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course
of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on
which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and
may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or
extend it to all actions.
1JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACICE 814 (1st ed. 1938).
5. Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practiceof Pre-TrialProcedure,36 MICH.
L. REv. 215, 215-16 (1937).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 215.
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In 1983, Rule 16 was amended.8 Perhaps the most significant change
reflected in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 was that settlement was

explicitly mentioned for the first time. As it was originally promulgated in
1938, Rule 16 listed five specific subjects for consideration at a pretrial
conference, along with "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the

action." 9 Settlement was not among the five enumerated discussion subjects

in the original version of the rule. Edson Sunderland, the principal author of
the rule, did not see settlement as the primary purpose of the rule. Rather, he
saw its primary purpose as that of sharpening the preparation and presentation
of cases and helping to eliminate trial surprise." On the other hand, the
primary purpose of the 1983 rule, as amended, was to permit and encourage

early judicial intervention and control by the judge over a litigated civil case.
In addition to making case scheduling and case management an express goal
of pretrial procedure, the rule added to the subjects to be discussed at pretrial
conference a clause (7) that explicitly recognized that it had become fairly
common to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences."

As amended in 1983 Rule 16 states in pertinent part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its
discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for
such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2)
establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful
pretrial activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial through more
thorough preparation, and; (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 212 (2d ed. 1990)
[hereinafter WRIGHT 6A].
9. MOORE, supra note 4, at 814.
David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
10.
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1975-79 (1989). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8
137
Rulemaking,
§ 1522 at 218, and 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
app. c at 244 (1999) [hereinafter WRIGHT 12A].
See WRIGHT 6A, supra note 8, at 212, and Rule 16 which states in part:
11.
(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in categories of actions exempted
by district court rule as inappropriate, the judge, or a magistrate when
authorized by district court rle, shall, after consulting with the attorneys
for the parties and any unrepresented parties, by a scheduling conference,
telephone, mail, or other suitable means, enter a scheduling order that
limits the time (1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; (2) to
file and hear motions; and (3) to complete discovery. The scheduling
order also may include (4) the date or dates for conferences before trial,
a final pretrial conference, and trial; and (5) any other matters appropriate
in the circumstances of the case....
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants
at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to.... (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial
8.

1999]

ETHICAL LA WYERING IN ADR

The rule was amended again in 1993. Among the most important
changes was an explicit recognition of the court's authority to "take appropriate action" with respect to the subjects eligible for consideration at pretrial
conferences, including settlement. 2 In its Notes, the Rules Advisory
Committee elaborated, setting out a variety of specific ADR devices that
might be used to accomplish the settlement goal. 3
So, in ten short years, we went from a federal pretrial conference rule
intended to sharpen issues for trial, to a rule that explicitly authorized and
encouraged settlement discussions, to a rule that now encourages the use of
special procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation,
nonbinding arbitration, and early neutral evaluation to assist in settlement.
These procedural innovations in the federal system have been adopted, and in
many cases expanded upon, in many state court systems. 4 By encouraging a
much more active role for judges and attorneys in pursuing the settlement of
procedures to resolve the dispute....
Id. at 212-13 and § 1525, 248-49. The advisory committee commentary to the 1983 amendment

stated:

...settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as
possible. Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) to impose
settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing
a neutral forum for discussing the subject might foster it. . . . For
instance, a judge to whom a case has been assigned may arrange, on his
own motion or at a party's request, to have settlement conferences
handled by another member of the court or by a magistrate.... A
settlement conference is appropriate at any time ....

In addition to

settlement, Rule 16(c)(7) refers to exploring the use of procedures other
than litigation to resolve the dispute. This includes urging the litigants to
employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse.
WRIGHT 12A, supra note 10, at 249-50 (citations omitted).
12. Rule 16(c) now reads:
Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences.
At any conference under this rule consideration may be given and the
court may take appropriate action with respect to (1) the formulation and
simplification of the issues ....

(9) settlement and the use of special

procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute
or local rule....

WRIGHT 12A, supra note 10, at 242.
13. In the Advisory Committee Notes to the rule the committee explains: "Even if a
case cannot immediately be settled, the judge, and attorneys can explore possible use of
alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation,
and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the dispute without a full
trial on the merits." Id. at 256.
14. One of the states that has taken Rule 16 a step further is Minnesota. See MINN. CT.
R. 114.01-114.14 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring attorneys to consider ADR in every civil case,
discuss ADR with their clients and opposing counsel, and advise the court of their conclusions
about ADR, including selection of an ADR process, selection of a neutral and the timing of the
process).
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civil cases, Rule 16 and its state counterparts reflect the creation and
development of a settlement culture.
This settlement culture has been further enhanced by the creative and
imaginative approaches taken by certain judges to rearrange the pretrial
litigation process to set the stage for settlement. A prominent example of such
an innovative practice is the "two-stage" approach to discovery and motion
practice planning that was promoted by the late Robert F. Peckham, former
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. 5 Magistrate Wayne Brazil of the Northern District explains this
two-stage process in Chapter 16 of Moore's FederalPractice:
Under this approach, discovery and motion practice are
limited during the first stage of the pretrial period to
development or explication of the core matters that must be
addressed to set the stage for serious settlement negotiations, and even these core matters are not explored
exhaustively. The goal in the first stage is to expose only
the most consequential evidence and, when necessary to
secure rulings on pivotal legal issues. At the end of this
first stage, all formal pretrial activity is put on hold for a
month or so. It is during this hiatus that the parties take a
hard run at settlement, through direct negotiations, settlement conferences, or ADR."6
Over the past ten years, the United States Congress has also given attention to
settlement and the use of ADR in the federal courts with the passage of the
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) in 199017 and, more recently, the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (ADRA)."8 Moreover, by executive order, the

15. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
16. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §16.51 (3d ed. 1998)
(citations omitted).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471,473(a)(6)(A) and (B). The CJRA required each district court
to submit, by the end of 1993, a civil case "expense and delay reduction plan" which required
the courts to consider "authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution
programs." 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990).
18. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315 §§ 1-12, 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 2993-98 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 651-58). The ADRA passed
the House and Senate as H.R. 3528. Building on the CJRA, the ADRA requires all federal
district courts to authorize the use of ADR in all civil cases, while allowing the courts to grant
exemptions.
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President of the United States has directed federal litigators to suggest and use
ADR in appropriate circumstances.' 9
II. LAWYERING IN ADR SETTINGS

Not surprisingly, this settlement culture has prompted lawyers to alter
their behavior somewhat - particularly when representing clients in the ADR
programs favored by the courts - and to develop new skills and tactics. As we
shall see, some of these behaviors are problematic from the standpoint of legal
ethics. For discussion purposes, we will consider the three ADR devices most
frequently found in the court setting: court-annexed arbitration (CAA),
summary jury trial (SJT), and mediation.
It should be noted at the outset that there are critical differences among
these three processes. CAA and SJT have been characterized as "trial-run"
processes, while mediation has been characterized as a "facilitative" process.Y°
Viewed somewhat differently, CAA and SJT have the goal of predicting the
trialoutcome while the goal of mediation is problem-solving." As we shall

see, these differences account for some of the more ethically troubling
variations in lawyer behavior when representing clients in these alternative
fora.
A. COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION.

Court-annexed arbitration (CAA) is a form of
"alternative
adjudication"'22 that results in a judgment (albeit generally nonbinding). CAA
diverts civil suits seeking monetary damages from a court's docket to a single
arbitrator or a two or three person arbitration panel.23 The arbitrators

generally are local private lawyers who volunteer to serve as arbitrators for a
nominal fee. The arbitration proceedings are usually quite informal and

19. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 3 C.F.R. 157 (1997).
20. See Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of ParticipationShould be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2079, 2080 n.1 (1993).
21. See Craig A. McEwen, PursuingProblem-Solving orPredictiveSettlement, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (1991).
22.
ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL, INST. FOR CIv. JUST., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION:
AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 1 (1988).

23.
For general profiles of the court-annexed arbitration programs adopted in
American courts, see Deborah R. Hensler, What we know and don't know about courtadministeredarbitration,69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986); John P. Mclver & Susan Keilitz, CourtAnnexed Arbitration:An Introduction, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 123 (1991). For detailed profiles of the
ADR programs in the federal district courts, see ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA,
FED. JUD. CENTER & CPR INsT. FOR Disp. RESOL, ADR AND SETFLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL

DIsTRiCT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS (1996).
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abbreviated. Rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed and witnesses are
discouraged. Normally, counsel for the parties present the evidence they
would introduce at trial in summary form.24
Thus, the lawyering skills that are most important in CAA proceedings
might be characterized as summarization skills. Professor (now Dean)
Edward Sherman has argued that, "the art of summarization is the centerpiece
of court supervised ADR proceedings."2 Dean Sherman analogizes these
skills to a closing argument before a jury, but points out important differences.
In CAA, a lawyer is not limited to commenting only on evidence that is in the
record, but may discuss any matter that would be admissible at trial.
Furthermore, in CAA, a lawyer may argue his or her conception of the law,
but would be prevented from doing so in a closing argument to a jury.26
This reliance on summary presentations may open the door to forms of
gamesmanship or misrepresentation. For example, counsel may be encouraged to breathe life into the presentation of the evidence through such
techniques as reading selected questions from a deposition and having cocounsel provide answers that rely on various sources. 27 Co-counsel's
appearance and demeanor may make for a much more credible presentation
than the actual witness or witnesses. Moreover, the synthesis offered by cocounsel may not be entirely accurate. 28 Thus, there are risks of gamesmanship
and misrepresentation inherent in these summary proceedings that can be
contained only by high ethical standards on the part of the lawyers.
B. SUMMARY JURY TRIALS

Although the summary jury trial (SJT) is also a "trial run" process,29 it
serves as an adjunct to settlement negotiations between the parties to a civil
dispute. According to its originator and chief promoter, Judge Thomas
Lambros of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the

24. Although the verdict of the arbitrator(s) is nonbinding, it is converted into a court
judgment unless a party requests a trial de novo within a specified time period. To discourage
de novo appeals from arbitration awards, a number of programs provide that costs (and
sometimes attorneys fees) may be imposed against a party requesting a de novo trial if that party
does not improve upon the arbitration award at trial.
25. Edward F. Sherman, Reshaping the Lawyer's Skills for Court-Supervised ADR,
T Ex. B. J.,
Jan. 1988, at 47,48.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 49.
28. Id.
29. See Sherman, supra note 20.
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purpose of the SJT is to "decimate" the "barriers to settlement,"' by providing
the parties with an opportunity to present their case in summary form before
a live jury. It is believed that this common experience will then provide a
focal point for more meaningful settlement discussions.
The SJT model promoted by Judge Lambros is a half-day proceeding
before a six member jury. After an abbreviated voir dire and opening

comments by a presiding official, the attorneys present their cases in narrative

form, summarizing anticipated testimony and reading from statements, reports,

or depositions.

Live witnesses generally are not permitted and formal

objections are discouraged. Judge Lambros explains: "Representations of
facts must be supportable by reference to discovery materials, including
depositions, stipulations, documents, and formal admissions, or by a

professional representation that counsel has spoken with the witness and is
repeating that which the witness stated."31 At the close of these presentations,
the presiding official gives the jury abbreviated instructions on the law, and

the jury retires to deliberate. When the jury returns its verdict, counsel are
given an opportunity to question jurors regarding the verdict. The lawyers and

their clients then resume their settlement negotiations, using the SJT
experience as a guide to a settlement agreement.32
The lawyering skills and tactics that are most prominent during an SJT
are therefore quite similar to the summarization skills required of a lawyer in
a court-annexed arbitration.3 3 Although empirical studies suggest that the use
of the SJT may result in significant savings of time and cost in some cases,34
critics have questioned whether the SJT may accurately predict actual jury

trial outcomes 35 and whether an over reliance on attorney summaries may

30. Judge Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 468 (1984).
31. Id. at471.
32. Id. See also Thomas D. Lambros, The sumnary jury trial - an alternative method
of resolving disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986).
33. See Sherman, supra note 25, at 48.
34. See generally James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts:
A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL 213 (1989) (comparing the use of SJT in Florida state and federal courts); Thomas B.
Metzloff, Reconfiguring The Summary Jury Trial, 41 DuKE L.J. 806 (1992) (reporting on SJT
use in a voluntary program in the North Carolina state courts).
35. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 374
(1986); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL L.
REV. 1, 39-40 (1987); Charles F. Webber, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Playing By the
Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1495, 1515-17 (1989); Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or
the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87, 99100 (1990).
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encourage lawyer gamesmanship and questionable ethical behavior.36 Thus,
this "trial- run" process presents risks similar to those in court-annexed
arbitration. These risks can only be contained by adherence to high ethical
standards.
C. MEDIATION

While court-annexed arbitration and summary jury trial are "trial-run"
processes,37 emulating adjudication, mediation is a less formal "facilitative"'3
process and is usually associated with negotiation.39 Mediation is based on the
principle of party self-determination, and it is the parties, rather than the thirdparty neutral, who determine the outcome of the dispute.' The mediation
process therefore permits the parties (clients) to play a more active role, in
concert with their lawyers, in the resolution of the dispute."'
Over the past two decades, American courts have experimented with the
use of mediation in a wide variety of cases. The earliest court mediation
programs tended to be confined to relatively minor civil and criminal matters.
These so-called "community dispute resolution programs" focused on disputes
between neighbors, landlords and tenants, and consumers and merchants.42
During the past decade, however, court-sponsored mediation programs have
been extended to include a much wider range of disputes, even complex civil
cases seeking large damage awards, and although mediation is essentially a
consensual process, some courts now order parties to mediation on a

36. See, e.g., Posner,supra note 35 at 374; Webber, supra note 35, at 1516. See also
Alfini supra note 34, at 220; Metzloff supra note 34, at 812-13. For a discussion of the
arguments for and against the SJT, see Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury
Trial Back on the Docket: Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1069, 1081 (1995).
37. See Sherman, supra note 20.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1998) ("Mediation is best understood as an extension of the
negotiation process"); Peter Robinson, Contending with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A
Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963,964 (1998)
("Mediation is facilitated negotiation").
40. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 39, at 1371.
41. Id. at 1375-81.
42. See DANIEL McGiujs, U.S. DOJ, COMMUNITY DIsPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS
AND PUBLIC POuCY (1986).
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in
mandatory basis.43 These developments have increased lawyer interest 45
sessions.
mediation
in
participation
direct
their
encouraged
and
mediation"
Because it is mediation's consensual character that tends to distinguish
it from arbitration and other adjudicative processes, most practice commentaries" and some research studies47 focus primarily on the techniques and
strategies used by mediators to effect settlement. More recently, however, an
emerging literature is focusing on the role and behavior of the lawyer
representing a client in a mediation.4" Some of these commentaries identify
a problem of lawyer misrepresentation in mediation.49
In an article in Dispute Resolution Magazine, Bruce Meyerson, a
prominent Arizona litigator and mediator, asks the question: "What obligation
does a lawyer in mediation have to be honest with the mediator, the opposing
party and counsel?"' He reports on a conversation that he had recently with
a well-known mediator and mediation trainer, who told Mr. Meyerson: "Don't
believe anything a lawyer will tell you during a mediation!""'
John Cooley, a prominent attorney-mediator, has taken Meyerson's
concerns a step further and analyzed the types of deception practiced in
mediation.52 Cooley concludes that the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct offer no guidance to lawyer mediators and lawyers representing
clients in mediation as to those types of deception that are acceptable and
those that are not. 53 Cooley argues: "As long as there are no uniform ethical
43. See generally, NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POuCY
AND PRACTICE app. c (2d ed. 1994) ("Text of Selected Mediation Legislation By Jurisdiction").
44. See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker,A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at
54.
45. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997).
See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES (1996); JOSEPH B.
46.
STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING CONRucr (1987); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); JAY FOLBERG AND ALLISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION (1984).
47.
See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, MediatorSettlement Strategies, 8
LAw & PoL'Y 7 (1986); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is this the End
of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991).
48. See, e.g., John W. Cooley, National Inst. for Trial Advocacy, Mediation Advocacy
(1996); Bruce E. Meyerson, Telling the Truth in Mediation:MediatorOwed Duty of Candor,
DISP. RESOL MAG., Winter 1997, at 17; John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use andAbuse,
29 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Mediation Magic];Nolan-Haley, supra note 39,
at 1375-81; Robinson, supra note 39; Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representationof Clients
in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to StructureAdvocacy in a Nonadversarial
Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. REOL 269 (1999);.
49. See Meyerson, supra note 48; Mediation Magic, supra note 48, at 101-03.
50. Meyerson, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. Mediation Magic, supra note 48, at 101-03.
53. Id. at 91-106.
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standards defining truthfulness in mediation, lawyer-mediators, and mediation
advocates will have the unfettered capacity to practice their showmanship and
to produce their 'magic' effects by any method they wish." 4
III. ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS IN ADR SETINGS
Given this range of real and potential behaviors exhibited by lawyers in
ADR settings, there is a compelling need to articulate the ethical constraints
on lawyers when they represent clients in ADR settings. The twin problems
of gamesmanship and misrepresentation are particularly troubling. Unfortunately, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide little guidance
to the lawyer engaged in settlement activities in ADR. What is worse, the one
rule that is most instructive provides guidance that, standing alone, is inimical
to the proper functioning of the litigation process.
Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules has the high-minded title: "Truthfulness in
Statements to Others."" The rule states, in part: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person." 6
This is a wonderfully straightforward and clear statement that appears
to set a high standard of conduct for a practicing lawyer. On the face of it, it
seems to say that a lawyer should not lie. However, when we look to the
commentary to this rule we find in the second paragraph the following:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on
the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions
in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or
value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in
this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed
principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would
constitute fraud."7
So, when it comes to negotiations, the rule prohibits only "material" lies. It
thus opens the door to what some refer to as "puffery," and others as lying, in

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 106-07.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 4.1 (1983).
Id. at Rule 4.1(a).
Id. at Rule 4.1 cmt.
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negotiations. One commentator has concluded that the ABA has "unambiguously embraced 'New York hardball' as the official standard of practice."58
The commission that was responsible for drafting the rules, generally
referred to as the Kutak Commission, had originally proposed a truthfulness
rule, without all the conditional language, entitled "Fairness to Other
Participants."59 However, the Commission was convinced that such a
sweeping rule would be untenable for the practicing lawyer. In perhaps the
most influential article arguing for an amended rule that would permit
"puffery" in negotiation, Professor James White of the University of Michigan
Law School stated:
Pious and generalized assertions that the negotiator must be
'honest' or that the lawyer must use 'candor' are not
helpful. They are at too high a level of generality and they
fail to appreciate the fact that truth and truthful behavior at
one time in one set of circumstances with one set of negotiators may be untruthful in another circumstance with other
negotiators. 60
Professor White won the day. 6' The rule opens the door to lying in negotiations; and, since the adoption of the Model Rules almost two decades ago,

58. Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 411,445 (1988).
59. In part, the originally proposed rule was drafted as follows:
4.2 Fairness to Other Participants
(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with
other participants.
(b) A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of fact or
law, or fail to disclose a material fact known to the lawyer, even if
adverse, when disclosure is:
(1) Required by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(2) Necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law
resulting from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by
the lawyer to have been made by the client.
ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Discussion Draft 40 (1980). The Rule's fate was explained by the Commission's Reporter in
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing
Parties,33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 190 (1981).
60. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on -Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. J. 926, 929 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
61. For a discussion and critique of White's arguments, see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETics 726 (1986); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the
Virtuous Negotiator,8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 45 (1994).
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numerous commentators have written on this topic62 arguing variously that we
need a continuing discourse on the ethics of lying in negotiation because our
discourse is, as one commentator put it, "uncritical, self-justificatory and
largely unpersuasive."63 This commentator states: ". . . lying is not the
province of a few 'unethical lawyers' who operate on the margins of the
profession. It is a permanent feature of advocacy and thus of almost the entire
province of law."" Others have argued that we need an alternative model for
negotiation that emphasizes truth seeking,65 or that we need a negotiation rule
that articulates the various "conventions" in negotiations.' Alternatively, this
latter commentator goes so far as to accept lawyer deceit as a negotiation norm
and suggests that we might consider a "caveat lawyer" rule (recognize that
lying is an inherent part of the negotiation process and just accept the fact that
anything goes).67 These commentaries leave one with a strong sense of unease
over this ethics low-water mark.
With the increased use of ADR by the courts, the application of Rule 4.1
has become more problematic. Should Rule 4.1 be seen to extend beyond the
negotiation setting to apply to lawyering activities in ADR proceedings? Or,
should Rule 3.3, which is entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal,"6 8 apply?
Similar to Rule 4.1, Rule 3.3 states that, "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make
a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." Unlike Rule 4.1, Rule
3.3 does not have the same kind of qualifying language in the commentary to
the rule. Therefore, the lawyer's obligation of candor to a judge or a court is
much higher than the lawyer's obligation of truthfulness in negotiation.

62. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV.
75 (1985); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1387 (1986); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1987); Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REV. LITIG.
173 (1989); Christopher J. Shine, Deception and Lawyers: Away from a Dogmatic Principle
and Toward a Moral UnderstandingofDeception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722 (1989); Ruth
Fleet Thurman, ChippingAway at Lawyer Veracity: The ABA's Turn Toward Situation Ethics
in Negotiations, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL 103 (1990); Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of
Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 LA. L. REV. 447 (1995); Charles B. Craver, Negotiation
Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being
Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713 (1997).
63. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219,
1272 (1990).
64. Id.
65. Loder supra note 61, at 93.
66. Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 103
(1982).
67. Id. at 125.
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.3 (1983).
69. Id. Rule at 3.3 (a)(1).
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Indeed, the Rule 3.3 obligation has been referred to as a "requirement of
absolute truthfulness." 70
While ADR proceedings would appear to fall into a gap between the
formal proceedings contemplated by Rule 3.3 and the informal settings
contemplated by Rule 4.1, as written, it would seem that Rule 4.1 would
apply. Because Rule 3.3 applies only to proceedings before a "tribunal," and
given the relative informality of ADR proceedings, it would appear that Rule
3.3 would be inapplicable to even the most formal ADR proceedings.
Although the term "tribunal" is not defined in the "Terminology" section of
the ABA Model Rules, it is used in the sense of an adjudicative proceeding:
"... the context in which the term is used in the Rules makes it clear that
'tribunal' refers to a trial-type proceeding in which witnesses are questioned,
evidence is presented, the parties and their counsel participate fully, and the
decision is rendered by a fact-finder."7
Even the more formal ADR
proceedings such as court-annexed arbitration and summary jury trial do not
meet these criteria.' For example, the parties are generally discouraged from
using witnesses in both.73 Certainly, mediation would not qualify as a tribunal
under even the most relaxed criteria.74

IV. A PROPOSAL TO REVISE RuLE 4.1
Thus, lawyering activities in ADR proceedings would appear to be
governed by the permissive Rule 4. 1(rather than the absolute truthfulness Rule
3.3), which provides an inadequate ethics infrastructure to support the
settlement culture that has developed over the past twenty years. Rather than
circumscribing the gamesmanship and misrepresentation that can and does
take place in ADR proceedings," the language in the commentary to Rule 4.1
may actually encourage deceptive practices.76 Moreover, the rule does not
take account of the enhanced role for the client in ADR proceedings.
The proposed revision of Rule 4.1 set forth below recognizes that
settlement discussions are now likely to take place in more structured and
complex settings than the informal negotiations contemplated by the present
Rule 4.1. Thus, the language in the commentary attempting to distinguish
70. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr 335 (2d ed. 1992).
71. Id. at 334.
72. See supra discussion in Part II.
73. See supra discussion in Part II.
74. See supra discussion in Part II.
75. See supra discussion in Part II.
76. See supra discussion in Part III.
77. See supra discussion in Part II.
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between "material" facts and other kinds of facts, opening the door to lying in
ADR settings, has been struck.7" In addition, a new Rule 4.1(b) prohibits a
lawyer from assisting his or her client "in reaching a settlement agreement that
is based on reliance upon a false statement of fact made by the lawyer's
client." Finally, a paragraph has been added to the commentary that
recognizes the increased use of dispute resolution alternatives and cautions the
lawyer to be truthful and to inform his or her client of the dictates of this rule.
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS
RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN
STATEMENTS TO OTHERS

or

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;

(b) assist the client in reaching a settlement agreement that is based
on reliance upon a false statement of fact made by the lawyer's client; or
ft (c) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by
a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
Comment
Misrepresentation
[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a
client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing
party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false.
Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.

78. While the language in the commentary contemplates more than settlement
negotiations, one must ask whether a lawyer's obligation to tell the truth should be any more
relaxed in transactional negotiations than in settlement negotiations. At least one state has
considered deleting from its rules of professional conduct the word "material" and the
accompanying language in the commentary "to avoid countenancing, 'puffing' or other less than
honest methods of negotiation as countenanced by the Model ABA Rule.... [O]ne should be
able to accept the word of a lawyer as truth." A. Jeffry Taylor, Work in Progress: The Vermont
Rules of Professional Conduct, 20 VT. L. REV. 901, 913 (1996). The Supreme Court of
Vermont ultimately chose to adopt the language of the ABA Model Rules.
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Alternative Dispute Resolution
[21 A lawyer's duty of truthfulness applies beyond formal tribunals (see
Rule 3.3) to less formal settings. The obligation to be truthful is particularly
essential with the increased use by courts of dispute resolution alternatives
such as mediation, arbitration, mini-trial, and summary jury trial to effect
settlement. When representing a client in these less formal settings, the
lawyer may often encounter situations where both the lawyer and his or her
client participate freely in open and frank discussions unconstrained by rules
of evidence or procedure. The lawyer should therefore inform the client of the
lawyer's duty to be truthful and the lawyer's inability to assist the client in
reaching a settlement agreement that is procured in whole or in part as a result
of a false statement of material fact or law made by the client.
Fraudby Client
[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer
to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the
client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this
paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6.
Changes in Rule 4.1 along these lines are particularly important in light
of the fact that ADR proceedings, especially mediation, are intended to
encourage active client participation79 and involve third party neutrals. ADR
settings are therefore likely to involve more complex interactions and

79. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 39; Sternlight, supra note 48 at 273; McEwen,
supra note 21 at 86.
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communications than the traditional lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations contemplated by the current rule, making them fertile ground for lawyer gamesmanship and misrepresentation. Under these circumstances, it is imperative that
we have a rule that sets a clear, unambiguous standard of truthfulness.8 0
CONCLUSION

There is a critical need to create an ethics infrastructure to support the
settlement culture that has developed over the past two decades. In a
broadening variety of dispute resolution settings, lawyers and their clients
have only the language of ABA Model Rule 4.1 to guide their behavior. The
current Rule 4.1 is ambiguous at best, and at worst, would appear to
countenance gamesmanship and misrepresentation by lawyers in ADR
proceedings. The rule should be re-drafted to hold lawyers to a higher
standard of conduct in settlement discussions. The twenty-first century lawyer
will be spending much of her time communicating with third parties in a wide
variety of dispute resolution fora. It is imperative that the rules governing a
lawyer's behavior in these contexts establish standards of professional
conduct that will maintain the integrity of our civil justice system and assist
in restoring public confidence in the legal profession.

80. For discussion of "a collaborative process of moral truth-seeking," see Loder, supra
note 61 at 30.

